Withdrawing Under Fire Lessons Learned from Islamic Insurgencies (Hardcover)
|Author: Joshusa L. Gleis|
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|Examines how insurgents fight and what motivates them; Draws lessons from six case studies of Islamist insurgencies: the British withdrawal from Iraq (1920s), the French from Algeria (1960s), the Soviets from Afghanistan (1980s), the Americans from Somalia (1990s), the Israelis from southern Lebanon (2000), and the Israelis from the Gaza Strip (2005); Provides timely, expert guidance for today''s challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan|
From the Publisher:
The post-9/11 world has witnessed a rebirth of irregular and asymmetrical warfare, which, in turn, has led to an increase in conflicts between conventional armies and non-state armed groups. In their haste to respond to the threat from insurgencies, nations often fail to plan effectively not only for combat operations but also for withdrawal, which, win or lose, is inevitable. In order to answer the question of how to withdraw from engagement with an insurgency, security consultant Joshua L. Gleis examines how insurgencies are conducted and what, if anything, is unique about the Islamist variety. He then proposes ways to combat these groups successfully and to disentangle one's military forces from the war once strategic objectives have been met---or once it is clear that they cannot be.||Because this type of warfare is dynamic and ever changing, Withdrawing Under Fire is not meant to suggest a set of cookie-cutter solutions for how to withdraw from insurgencies. Rather, the author analyzes six counterin-surgency operations that have taken place in the past, with the intention of gleaning from them as many lessons as possible to better prepare for future withdrawals. The literature on how wars end has failed to explore irregular warfare. This much-needed reexamination serves as an indispensable starting point.